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Abstract. Off-chain transaction channels represent one of the lead-
ing techniques to scale the transaction throughput in cryptocurren-
cies such as Bitcoin. They allow multiple agents to route payments
through one another. So far, the topology and construction of pay-
ment networks has not been explored much. Participants are expected
to minimize costs that are due to the allocation of liquidity as well
as blockchain record fees. In this paper we study the optimization of
maintenance costs of such networks. We present for the first time, a
closed model for symmetric off-chain channels, and provide efficient
algorithms for constructing minimal cost spanning-tree networks un-
der this model. We prove that for any network demands, a simple
hub topology provides a 2-approximation to the minimal mainte-
nance cost showing that spanning trees in general are efficient. We
also show an unbounded price of anarchy in a greedy game between
the transactors, when each player wishes to minimize his costs by
changing the network’s structure. Finally, we simulate and compare
the costs of payment networks with scale free demand topologies.
1 Introduction
A main approach to solve the scalability problem in Bitcoin is to
use off-chain transaction channels that allow parties to transfer funds
while communicating directly, and only occasionally to settle the ac-
cumulated transfers that they have done on the blockchain [25]. In
this manner, space on the blockchain (which is highly constrained)
will be used to aggregate the result of multiple transactions that oc-
curred over channels.
Transaction channels are created between a pair of participants
by locking money into a “joint account”. The money is transfered
between the participants by exchanging signed transaction messages
that change the way funds in this account are allocated. The channel
is closed by the participants when sending the latest transaction to the
blockchain, which finalizes this allocation. Channels can be chained
together securely to allow users to transfer funds to others that they
are not directly connected to, and thus form fast payment networks
that provide near instant payments that require few interactions with
the blockchain.
The implication of this construction is that transaction channels
necessitate locking liquidity for extended periods of time. These liq-
uidity costs are balanced against the costs of fees that must be paid
whenever channels are opened or closed—an operation that requires
transactions on the blockchain. Intuitively, increasing liquidity costs
by locking more funds into the channel lowers the fees that will be
paid, as channels will need to be reset less often.
In this paper we take the first steps to study and optimize the costs
of payment networks. We study both game-theoretic formation of
channels, and globally optimal solutions.
Our Contributions:
• We show that hub topologies can be highly efficient in terms of
costs minimization, which increases the concern that large mo-
nopolistic players will arise and out-perform decentralized net-
works. We show this by exploring cost-optimal topologies and liq-
uidity allocations, and by proving that a hub topology provides a
2-approximation to the optimal maintenance cost of any topology.
We further show that this approximation is tight.
• Using a model for the expected lifetime of symmetric channels
(when both parties transfer coins in the same rate in both direc-
tions) from [9] we derive the optimal liquidity allocation for any
topology and routing algorithm.
• We solve the problem of building cost-optimal spanning tree net-
works for symmetric demands.
• Finally, we explore a game theoretic model for the network for-
mation of payment channels by defining a game in which partic-
ipants connect to the network and seek to minimize their costs.
We study the equilibrium points in the restricted setting of trees
for this game, and prove an unbounded price of anarchy for this
setting.
Our results open the field for further explorations of the costs of pay-
ment networks, and highlight the need for further study of more gen-
eral cases (such as non-symmetric demands).
1.1 Payment Networks Basics
Payment channels are based on exchanging signed messages that de-
scribe how to allocate funds between pair of agents. For example, let
us assume that Alice and Bob opened a payment channel by lock-
ing 0.5 BTC each. When Alice wants to transfer 0.1 BTC to Bob,
she signs a message containing the new channel balance (of 0.4 BTC
for Alice, 0.6 BTC coins for Bob, as described in figure 1, transac-
tion 1). She sends the message to Bob, that transmits the message to
the blockchain at will. Bob will usually not do so immediately, but
rather hold on to this message and replace it with newer allocations
after more transfers are made.
While transaction channels themselves are limited to exchanges
between pairs of individuals, further developments like the Light-
ning network[25] allow users to securely route payments over longer
paths and thus can allow the construction of a well connected net-
work that can be used to transfer money quickly and with relatively
little interaction with the blockchain. For example, let us assume that
Alice wants to transfer money to Charlie. Instead of opening a shared
payment channel or transacting directly via the blockchain, she can
first transfer money to Bob via their shared payment channel, and ask
Bob to send money to Charlie via another payment channel (as de-
scribed in figure 1, transaction 2). In order to avoid the risk of having
an intermediate node accept money without forwarding the payment,
paths are composed using HTLCs (Hash time lock contracts) that re-
lease funds only if a secret—initially known only to the sender—is
released. More details can be found in [25].
Figure 1: Draw of payment network usage
When the most recent state of a channel allocates all funds in the
joint account to one of the agents, it is no longer possible to transfer
money to that agent using the channel. Further transfers must either
use the blockchain directly, or the channel must go through a “re-
set”; recording the channel balance on the blockchain, and opening
a new channel (alternatively funds can be added to the channel by
the participant that lacks liquidity, but this too requires a blockchain
transaction). As we have already mentioned, blockchain records in-
cur a constant fee.
1.2 Related work
The original Lightning Network paper [25] suggests a BGP-like rout-
ing method. The implementation of the Lightning network (off-chain
network over the Bitcoin blockchain), uses source routing, based on
channel usage fees. The Raiden network [1], like other P2P net-
works, implements a Kademila-based routing system, in order to
minimize the number of hops. Another idea for scaling transactions
over Ethereum, is the Perun payment hub [11]. The idea is based on
a network in the structure of a hub, that will be efficient in the num-
ber of routing hops per transaction. The paper implements a secured
method for shortcutting several hops, based on smart contracts.
Several recent papers [5] [6] [13] discuss the same question of
payment channels creation game as we did. However, while those pa-
pers choose a transaction-series/single-channel based model, we dif-
fer with a network traffic rates model. A recent paper [4] discussed
the same question of global fees optimization in payment channels
network design, but again it uses the same transaction-series model.
Two recent papers [8] [28] present a real data-driven analysis of
lightning routing, fees and topology. We differ from them by pre-
senting a theoretical model to this problem, rather than analyzing
real-world data.
Some recent works [15; 26; 17] refer to other side-effects of rout-
ing (such as privacy and memory demands), and present efficient al-
gorithms for the routing problem. The Fulgor and Rayo paper [22],
that describes two of the major methods for the remaining privacy
and concurrency in off-chain networks, assumes that routing path is
being chosen by the transactor, in order to minimize the fee per trans-
action.
The topology of off-chain networks, has been studied in [2]. Mea-
sures such as the connectivity of the network and routing availability
are the main focus. Algorithms for balancing edges (using “smart
routing” of transactions) have been presented and simulated in [29].
Some mathematical analysis of the expected channel lifetime over
off-chain channels, has been conducted [9]. We build upon and ex-
tend their model.
An economic model of the routing problem in Lightning, has been
studied in [12], but we differ from this research in the basic model:
The authors assume the cost of transmitting transactions is linearly
related to the volume of payments and therefore the payoff can be
formulated as a linear optimization problem. As far as we are aware,
we are the first to explore cost minimization in this setting.
A recent paper [19] presents an instance local solution to the chan-
nel resets problem, which is re-balancing a group of channels by
transacting in cycles. We differ from this paper, by our approach of
optimizing topology and liquidities, rather than re-balancing a liq-
uidities in some specific channels.
The Plasma paper [24] presents a generalization of payment chan-
nels to general state that is managed by local consensus protocols.
A few papers [21] [10] [23] discuss the problem of optimiz-
ing communication networks from the perspective of cut-capacities,
Gomory-Hu trees and submodular optimization. We use a similar ap-
proach in our paper.
2 The Model
We now present our model of off-chain payment networks. We first
define the state of a channel, and how transactions affect it, then de-
fine a payment network and a routing policy, and finally, a probabilis-
tic model for transaction demand.
The State of a Channel Let e be a payment channel between
two participants: Alice and Bob. The payment channel state is a pair
(ωA, ωB), denoting the internal allocation of funds between the par-
ticipants (Alice holds ωA coins, and Bob holds ωB coins). The sum
ω = ωA +ωB is called the liquidity of the channel, and the amounts
ωA, ωB must be non-negative.
Feasible Transactions The liquidity of the channel, remains con-
stant during its lifetime. Transactions, however, change the inter-
nal balance. Given a channel between Alice and Bob, with state
(ωA, ωB), a transaction of x coins from Alice to Bob changes the
state to (ωA − x, ωB + x). The transaction is feasible if and only if
0 ≤ x < ωA, i.e., it cannot reach or exceed the liquidity boundaries.
Although transfers in one direction are still possible when liquidity
is fully shifted to one of the channel’s sides, we assume the channel
has to always be ready for transfers in both directions (otherwise we
may be forced to use a blockchain transaction which takes very long).
Therefore, we assume channels are reset whenever liquidity has fully
shifted.
The Cost of Payment Channels We model the cost of locking
liquidity ω in the channel as α · ω coins per second, where α reflects
the interest rate in the economy. We further denote the blockchain fee
required to write a record by φ. This fee is paid whenever a channel
reset occurs. 1
We denote by RPS the rate of blockchain records per second that
are used to maintain channels. The cost of a channel (per time unit)
is then α · ω + φ ·RPS.
We are now ready for definitions pertaining to more complex net-
works:
Definition 1 (Payment Network). A payment network is described
by a graph G = (V,E), and a liquidity allocation ω : E → R+.
V denotes the set of transactors, E is the set of payment channels,
and ω(e) is the liquidity of channel e. We denote the sum of all chan-
nels’ liquidities as W . Transactions are transfered over paths in the
graph. A transaction of x coins via the path (e1, ..., en), changes the
state (ωi1 , ωi2) of channel ei (for every i), to be (ωi1 − x, ωi2 + x).
Transactions must be feasible for all channels along the path.
Given a payment network, it is important how payments are routed
(as this may in turn affect the volume of payments going through
individual channels).
Definition 2 (Routing Policy). A routing policy π over a graph G =
(V,E) is a function π such that π(i, j) is a legal path in G between
i and j with no cycles. For every i, j ∈ V there holds π(i, j) is the
reverse of π(j, i).
This definition refers to a state-independent symmetric routing
protocol. We restrict our attention to protocols that do not depend
on direction or state, since this is the current way payment networks
are implemented in Bitcoin (routing is independent of channel state
as state changes too quickly to allow for global routing adjustments
to occur).
Finally, we will define the demand matrix, which defines a proba-
bilistic model for transaction requests:
Definition 3 (The Demand Matrix). Let G = (V,E) be a payment
channel network, V = v1, . . . , vn and let (λi,j) denote the Demand
Matrix for transactions. Every second, vi transfers to vj an amount
of coins, from a Poisson process with mean λi,j .
The demand matrix along with the topology and routing protocol
effectively set the number of transfers on each channel and will later
allow us to derive the maintenance costs of the network.
2.1 Symmetric Networks
We are particularly interested in symmetric-demand networks, in
which each pair of participants transact at the same expected rate in
both directions, since such payments often cancel out and represent
an optimistic case for transaction channels’ lifetimes.
We thus assume that transaction amounts are all identical (for con-
venience, we assume all transfers are for 1 unit of money), and that
furthermore, transaction rates are symmetric: λij = λji, ∀ 1 ≤
i, j ≤ n.
The symmetric demands assumption, creates only balanced chan-
nels for every routing policy. That is because the traffic components
over a channel, are identical in both directions. Under this model,
each channel is simulating a random walk process. Every time a
transaction through the channel is infeasible (due to liquidity con-
straints), we reset the channel, and pay a constant blockchain fee.
1 There may in fact be added costs for writing more-complex transactions to
the blockchain that both transfer and reset the channel.
Definition 4. Let e be an off-chain transaction channel. Let Ti [sec-
onds] be the random variable of the channel lifetime after i − 1 re-
sets of the channel. Let φ [coins] be the constant fee for blockchain
record. We define RPSe [
records
seconds
], the average rate of records per
second, to be:
RPSe = lim
k→∞
E
[
k
T1 + ... + Tk
]
The blockchain cost per second is then φ ·RPSe.
Lemma 1. Let Ti [seconds] be the random variable of channel e’s
lifetime after i− 1 blockchain records. For every i, Let µe = E[Ti].
Therefore:
lim
k→∞
E
[
k
T1 + ...+ Tk
]
=
1
µe
Proof. From the Strong law of large numbers [16], since T1, . . . , Tk
are identically distributed, independent and have finite expected
value, the series of arithmetic means
T1+...+Tk
k
is converging almost
surely to µe. We will prove that
1
T1+...+Tk
k
converges almost surely
to 1
µe
. Let us denote:
Xk =
T1 + ...+ Tk
k
, X = µe,
A = {ω : lim
k→∞
Xk(ω) = X(ω)}
(1)
From convergence almost surely P (A) = 1. From the basic laws of
calculus, we know that on A ∩ {ω : X(ω) 6= 0} there holds
lim
k→∞
1
Xk(ω)
=
1
X(ω)
(2)
SinceX is a positive constant random variable, {ω : X(ω) 6= 0} =
Ω. Therefore:
1 ≥ Pr
(
lim
k→∞
1
Xk(ω)
=
1
X(ω)
)
≥ Pr(A ∩ {ω : X(ω) 6= 0}) = 1
(3)
From that we deduce Pr(limk→∞
1
Xk(ω)
= 1
X(ω)
) = 1. Mean-
ing that 1
T1+...+Tk
k
is converging almost surely to 1
µe
. We know that
T1, ..., Tk ≥ 1 because a channel reset requires at least one transac-
tion. Therefore:
T1+...+Tk
k
≥ 1 which implies 0 < 1
T1+...+Tk
k
≤ 1
for all k.
Let us denote a constant random variable Y = 1. We know Y has
finite expected value, and that | 1
Xk
| ≤ Y for all k. According to the
Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem [16], Since 1
Xk
converges
almost surely to 1
µe
, we deduce:
lim
k→∞
E
[
k
T1 + ...+ Tk
]
= E
[
1
µe
]
=
1
µe
(4)
The next corollary follows immediately:
Corollary 1.
∑
e∈E
RPSe =
∑
e∈E
1
µe
From this formula we will be able to compute the blockchain
records cost for every network and routing policy.
The Expected Lifetime Of Balanced Channels We recall a
derivation from [9] that finds the optimal liquidity allocation and ex-
pected channel lifetime, in a balanced channel:
Lemma 2 (From [9]). Let us have a channel between Alice and Bob,
with transfers of one coin occurring at a Poisson rate of λ from Alice
to Bob in each time slot, from Bob to Alice (a symmetric channel).
The liquidity of the channel is ω. The allocation that maximizes the
expected time for the next reset is an equal allocation, and the ex-
pected value of channel life time is: E[T ] = ω
2
8λ
.
The Rate of Transfer Through a Channel In off-chain networks,
every channel services multiple source-target transfers based on the
routing policy. We define the rate over an edge (this rate is the same
in both directions since our networks are symmetric):
Definition 5. Let π be a routing policy over a network G = (V,E),
with a symmetric demands matrix (λij). We denote for a channel
e ∈ E, the balanced channel Poisson rate of e as the following:
λe =
∑
{i,j} s.t e∈pi(i,j)
λij
This is essentially the total single-directional traffic over an edge,
as derived from the routing policy. We rely here on the fact that the
sum of Poisson random variables is a Poisson variable with rate equal
to the sum of their rates.
3 Hub Is 2-Approximation for Cost Optimal
Network
Theorem 1. Let G = (V,E) be an off-chain network, with a
routing policy π, and liquidity allocation ω : E → R+ . Let
H = (V,EH) be a hub topology centered at an arbitrary vertex
of G, v0 ∈ V . There exists a routing policy πH and liquidity allo-
cation ωH : EH → R+ for H , such that for every series of trans-
actions, the number of channel resets is at most twice the number of
channel resets in G, and the required liquidity is at most doubled:∑
e′∈EH
ωH(e
′) ≤ 2 ·∑e∈E ω(e).
Proof. The proof is based on duplicating original channel traffic inG
into two channels inH , by transferring the transaction throughout v0
hub. For every node x ∈ V , let us denote Ex = {e ∈ E s.t x ∈ e}
all the channels in G that x is connected to. We define ωH to be:
ωH({x, vo}) =
∑
e∈Ex
ω(e) (5)
We can now calculate the total amount of liquidity inH :
∑
e′∈EH
ω
′(e′) =
∑
x∈V \{v0}
∑
e∈Ex
ω(e)
≤
∑
x∈V
∑
{x,y}∈E
ω({x, y}) = 2
∑
e∈E
ω(e)
(6)
Any channel’s liquidity in the original graph, is added at most twice.
Now we will define the hub routing policy πH . Let (v1, v2) ∈ V 2
to be a pair of nodes. Let P = ({v1, x1}, {x1, x2}, ..., {xk, v2}) =
π(v1, v2) be the path in the original routing policy in G (between v1
and v2). The path PH = πH(v1, v2) in the new routing policy over
H is:
PH = ({v1, v0}, {v0, v2}) (7)
We remove all routing hops of the form {v0, v0} from the new path
PH . This is simply an elimination of the loop hops (trips back and
forth to the hub). We will show that the number of channel resets is
at most twice the original number of resets. We can look at each hub
channel {x, v0} as a “superposition” of all the original channels in
G that x was connected to, Ex. This is also a superposition in the
liquidity, since new liquidity is the sum of all Ex-channels liquidi-
ties. Therefore, we can split the original hub channel {x, v0}, into
imaginary channels that represent the original channels of Ex. We
split the total liquidity
∑
e∈Ex
ω(e) into the liquidities of imaginary
channels of Ex. We simulate the action of each transaction over the
imaginary channels in Ex, by changing their balances.
Each channel that was originally between x and y now has a share
of the liquidity in {x, v0} and in {v0, y}. Every time that an imag-
inary channel has to be reset (in the simulation), we will perform a
reset over that channel only in this both edges. It means that the hub’s
channel balance, summing the balances of all imaginary channels,
will reset only the imaginary channel’s balance component. This sim-
ulation fully implements a hub payment channel. In that way, for
every series of transactions, the number of resets is the sum of all
original Ex channels reset numbers or less (due to the loops we’ve
removed).
When applying these partial resets, we can calculate the number
of reset events over all the hub channels. It is bounded by the sum of
imaginary Ex channels reset events, for every x in V \ {v0}. As a
result, since every original G channel can be summed at most twice
(in two hub channels that connects to it’s endpoints), the total num-
ber of resets in H is at most twice the total number of resets in G.
This result holds for every set of transactions, and therefore for all
transaction demands.
Corollary 2. For any transaction demands, a hub over an arbitrary
node is a 2-approximation for the optimal maintenance cost network.
This corollary raises the concern that centralized topologies (such
as a hub) will be used widely in off-chain networks due to their
maintenance-cost efficiency, although they go against the decentral-
ized nature of blockchain technologies.
4 Optimizing Networks’ Maintenance Costs
In this section we will tackle the optimization problem seeking to
minimize the rate of blockchain record fees per second (for a given
amount of total liquidity).
4.1 Optimizing Liquidities Over a Network
Here we derive the optimal allocation of the liquidity between the
channels in any network, that minimizes the network’s maintenance
cost.
Lemma 3. Let G = (V, E) be a symmetric payment network, with
a set of vertices V , and n edges. Network channels have a λe trans-
action rate in both directions for every edge e. The optimal liquidity
allocation for G (with total liquidityW ) is: ω(e) = W λ
1
3
e
∑
e¯∈E
λ
1
3
e¯
.
Proof. Let xe =
ωe
W
. The chain record fees we wish to minimize are:
8φ
W 2
∑
e∈E
λe
x2e
(8)
with a condition of
∑
e∈E xe = 1.
We use Lagrange multipliers to optimize. Let us define g by the con-
dition
∑
e∈E xe = 1:
g(x1, ..., xn, k) =
8φ
W 2
∑
e∈E
λe
x2e
− k
∑
1≤i≤n
xi (9)
If we differentiate g and equate the derivatives to zero, we get
2λ1
x31
= ... =
2λn
x3n
,
∑
1≤i≤n
xi − 1 = 0 (10)
By that we get x3i ∝ λi (for every i).
Since xi, λi > 0 we conclude xi ∝ λ
1
3
i (for every i).
We know
∑
1≤i≤n xi = 1, which means we have to normalize
the xi’s. We have:
ω(e) = Wxe = W
λ
1
3
e∑
e¯∈E λ
1
3
e¯
(11)
Corollary 3. The optimal blockchain record fees per second for the
network, with liquidity sum ofW is: 8φ
W2
(∑
e∈E λ
1
3
e
)3
.
4.2 Cost Minimizing Spanning Trees
Given a demand matrix for transactions, we wish to understand what
the minimal cost payment network topology is. While solving this
problem for general topologies is left open in this work, we are able
to solve a more restricted case of tree topologies. The routing policy
in a spanning tree is unique, because there is a unique path between
every pair of vertices. This will allow us to more easily derive the
best tree topology.
First, we will calculate channels transaction rates, for a certain
demand matrix and spanning tree. In order to do that, we reiterate
the definition of cut-capacities from [18]:
Definition 6. Let G = (V,E) be a network, (λi,j) a capacity ma-
trix, and (X,V \ X) a graph cut. We define the cut’s λ-capacity to
be:
∑
{i,j}∈E s.t i∈X, j∈V \X
λi,j
Now we can calculate the transactions rate over a spanning tree
channel:
Lemma 4. The Poisson rate of a channel e, in a spanning tree net-
work T and demands matrix (λi,j), equals the λ-capacity of the cut
between the two connectivity components of T − e.
Once we can calculate the transaction rates in spanning trees, we
adapt our setting to one that was defined originally by T.C Hu in
1974 [18]. In Hu’s problem, we are given a demands matrix (λij),
denoting the communication requirements between pairs of nodes.
Hu finds a spanning tree T = (V,ET ), that minimizes
∑
e∈ET
λe
where λe is the communication traffic over the tree’s edge e. The
communication rate over a tree channel, is similarly calculated ac-
cording to lemma 4.
The Gomory-Hu tree (cut-tree) [14], can be calculated in polyno-
mial time, and in addition to other properties, the tree is assured to
minimize the sum of the tree’s channels traffic,
∑
e∈ET
λe.
Unlike Hu’s problem, we are interested in minimizing∑
e∈ET
(λe)
1
3 . In this section, we will prove that the Gomory-
Hu tree is also an optimal spanning tree for our problem. We will
dive into the theory of submodular functions, in order to understand
the properties of the Gomory-Hu tree.
4.3 Submodular Optimization of Induced Record
Fees
It is known [27] that the cut capacity function cλ(X,V \ X) for
non-negative capacity function over the edges λ : E → R+, is a
symmetric submodular function. The Gomory-Hu tree exists for ev-
ery symmetric submodular function [27], when the definition is being
adapted to a general function:
Theorem 2 (Queyranne, Maurice [27]). Let V be a ground set, and
let f : 2V → R+ be a symmetric submodular function. Given
s, t in V define the minimum cut between s and t as αf (s, t) =
min
W⊂V,|W∩{s,t}|=1
f(W ). Then, there is a Gomory-Hu tree that rep-
resents αf . That is, there is a tree T = (V,Et) and a liquidity func-
tion c : E → R+ such that αf (s, t) = αT (s, t) for all s, t ∈ V .
Moreover, a minimum cut in T induces a minimum cut according to
f for every s, t.
Since the cut capacity function cλ(X,V \X) is submodular and
symmetric, the Gomory-Hu tree that minimizes the sum of n−1 cut-
capacities (created between the connectivity components of T−e for
every channel e), is assured to exist. However, we wish to optimize∑
e∈E λ
1
3
e , and unlike the regular λ-cut capacity function, we cannot
claim that cλ(X,V \X) 13 is submodular (although it is symmetric).
2 Quite surprisingly, we show that the Gomory-Hu tree T for the
regular cut function minimizes
∑
e∈T cλ(Ce, V \ Ce)
1
3 .
Lemma 5. Let g : R → R be a non-decreasing function. Let
T be a Gomory Hu tree for a submodular symmetric non-negative
function f and a vertices set V . Then T minimizes the value of∑
e∈T g(f(Ce)) when Ce is one connectivity component of T − e
(which creates a cut).
Proof. We will use a property according to Adolphson and Hu [3].
For two spanning trees T1 = (V,E1), T2 = (V,E2), there is a
one-to-one mapping ψ between E1 and E2, which satisfies the fol-
lowing condition: For every e = {v1, v2} ∈ E1, ψ(e) is in the path
between v1, v2 in T2. Let T1 be a Gomory-Hu tree. For every edge
{v1, v2} = e1 ∈ E1 there is a unique edge e2 ∈ E2 that represents
a cut separating v1, v2 (since it is on the unique path between them
in T2). From the property of Gomory-Hu tree,
min
W⊂V,|W∩{v1,v2}|=1
f(W ) = f(Ce1) (12)
Thus, f(Ce1) ≤ f(Ce2). Since ψ is a one-to-one mapping∑
e∈E1
f(Ce) ≤
∑
e∈E1
f(Cψ(e)) =
∑
e∈E2
f(Ce) (13)
Since g is non decreasing, we can apply g over this equation:∑
e∈E1
g(f(Ce)) ≤
∑
e∈E1
g(f(Cψ(e))) =
∑
e∈E2
g(f(Ce)) (14)
Having that, every spanning Tree T will have greater or equal value
of
∑
e∈T g(f(Ce)), compared to the Gomory-Hu Tree.
2 In fact, a counter example to the submodularity of cλ(X, V \ X)
1
3 exists
and is provided in the full version.
The main corollary (Gomory-Hu tree is optimal spanning tree
network), is derived from the lemma with f(X) = cλ(X,V \
X), g(x) = x
1
3 :
Corollary 4. Let G = (V,E) be a complete graph with non-
negative transaction Poisson rate over the edges λ : E → R+. Let
T = (V,ET ) be a regular Gomory-Hu tree over the weight function
λ. Then T is the optimal spanning tree over the value of blockchain
record fees per second, and it can be calculated in polynomial time.
5 Towards Global Optimization
5.1 The Cost of a Symmetric Network
The first step in exploring the global optimization of the maintenance
cost, is to explore the connection between the different ingredients of
that cost.
We showed in corollary 3, that the RPS of a payment network
is linear in W−2, for every topology including the optimal. There-
fore, we can denote the network’s optimalRPS, as follows:RPS =
RPS0
W2
, Where RPS0 is the optimal RPS rate with W = 1 sum of
liquidity.
Now, we can calculate the liquidity W that minimizes the net-
work’s maintenance cost.
Lemma 6. LetG = (V,E) be a payment network, withW liquidity
sum. Let us denote α as the liquidity interest rate per second, φ as
a single blockchain record fee, and RPS0 as the optimal blockchain
records per second rate (when W = 1). When optimizing the value
of W , the optimal maintenance cost of the network is proportional
to:
M.Copt ∝ RPS
1
3
0 · φ
1
3 · α 23
Proof. According to our definition of channel costs, when summing
the liquidity and blockchain records over all the channels in E, the
full maintenance cost is:
M.C(W ) = φ · RPS0
W 2
+ α ·W (15)
We can derive this equation, and find the minimum point (via the sign
of the second derivative):
d
dW
M.C = α− 2 · φ ·RPS0
W 3
,Wopt =
(
2 · φ · RPS0
α
) 1
3
(16)
By placingWopt intoM.C(W ), we get the following relation:
M.C(Wopt) ∝ RPS
1
3
0 · φ
1
3 · α 23 (17)
5.2 Tightness of Hub 2-Approximation
The results of the previous section allow us to prove the tightness of
the hub 2-approximation, that we showed in section 3.
Theorem 3. For every ǫ > 0, there exists a set of transaction de-
mands (λij), in which the optimal maintenance cost per second, is
at least (2− ǫ) times lower than in every hub.
The full proof appears in the full version. The example that
achieves a factor of 2-ǫ is based on a setting in which agents are
paired together transacting only with each other. In a minimal cost
network each such pair would form a channel between them, but in a
hub, users are forced to route through two hops, incurring twice the
cost.
6 Greedy Games for Payment Networks
In this section we explore a ”network formation” model that consid-
ers that players wish to minimize their individual costs. We begin by
showing that the results of a greedy liquidity allocation, are about the
same.
6.1 Greedy Liquidity Allocation
We analyze how individual channels optimize liquidity:
Lemma 7. The minimal maintenance cost per second for a bal-
anced channel with λ transactions Poisson rate, α interest rate for
locked coins, and φ cost for a single Blockchain record, is:M.Ce =
3 3
√
2λ
1
3 φ
1
3 α
2
3 .
6.2 Tree Topology Greedy Game
In contrast to the liquidity allocation process, the greedy develop-
ment of the network topology, is much more interesting. Each one of
the players has an affect over the routing of other players. We will
study a game, in which each player (node) wished to optimize his
own costs, with restriction to the spanning tree topology. First, we
define a player’s share in channel fees:
Definition 7. Let G = (V,E) be a payment network. e ∈ E is a
channel with M.Ce maintenance cost per second, and λe balanced
transaction Poisson rate. Let us assume that player v ∈ V is transfer-
ring in λe(v) rate over the channel e. Therefore, the share of player
v in the maintenance cost of e is:
M.Ce(v) =
λe(v)
λe
·M.Ce
The player’s fees are proportional to their relative part in the trans-
action rate. The motivation for this definition is that fees are charged
as a fixed amount per transfer, that needs to cover the total cost of the
channel. We can now derive the total maintenance cost per second
for a single player:
Corollary 5. Let λe(v) denote the transaction rate of player v over
channel e. The maintenance cost per second for player v is then:
M.C(v) = 3
3
√
2φ
1
3α
2
3
∑
e∈E
λe(v)
λe
λ
1
3
e
It is clear from the formula, that a player’s costs depend on the
routing policy. However, over a spanning tree topology, the routing
is unique.
Definition 8. The Tree Topology Greedy Game, is a game between
the agents in V , assuming a certain demands matrix (λi,j). The goal
of every player v ∈ V , is to minimize his maintenance costs per
second,M.C(v).
The game starts with an initial spanning tree T0. In every turn,
each player can reconnect a single edge that is incident on its ver-
tex. Such re-connections are restricted to maintain the spanning tree
topology.
Definition 9. An equilibrium point in the spanning tree greedy game,
is a spanning tree T ∗, in which every player v ∈ V cannot reduce
his maintenance costs M.C(v) by a legal move (of reconnecting a
channel in the tree).
6.3 The Unbounded Price of Anarchy
Lemma 8. The spanning tree topology game has unbounded price of
anarchy. In other words, for everyK > 0 there exists an equilibrium
point in the spanning tree greedy game, T ∗, in which there holds
M.C(T ∗) > K ·M.C(TG) where TG is the optimal maintenance
cost spanning tree.
Proof. Let us build a series of equilibrium trees, Tk, with k vertices,
for every integer k ≥ 4. The demands matrix is the following: λ1,k =
1, λ1,2 = 1, and λk−1,k = 1. All the other transaction requirements
equal zero. For every k, we can build a chain spanning tree - a cyclic
ring along the nodes index, with removing the edge between vk−2
and vk−1. It creates 3 channels with λ = 1 transactions rate, and
zero transactions rate for all the other k − 3 channels. Now, let us
describe the equilibrium spanning tree of Tk by the set of edges Ek:
Ek = {{v1, v2}{v2, v3}, ..., {vk−2, vk−1}, {vk−1, vk}} (18)
This is a simple chain from v1 to vk. By a quick calculation, we
can see that using this spanning tree network, 2 channels will have
λ = 2 transactions rate ({v1, v2} and {vk−1, vvk}). All the other
k − 3 channels will have a transaction rate of λ = 1. Therefore, the
ratio of maintenance cost per second, between Tk and the optimal
spanning tree, according to corollary 7, is at least:
(k − 3) + 2 43
3
(19)
Since this expression is converging to infinity, for every value of K
there exists k, such that M.C(Tk) > K ·M.C(TG). We will com-
plete the proof by showing that Tk is an equilibrium for every k ≥ 4.
It is clear that the nodes from the series v3, ..., vk−2 has no in-
terest to reconnect a channel connected with them, since their costs
are fully payed by the remained nodes. v1 and vk are symmetric, as
well as v2 and vk−1. It is clear these two pairs don’t benefit from
reconnecting, with both external nodes or with each other.
A precise examination shows that all the agents have no interest
for structure change. Therefore, Tk is an equilibrium for every k ≥
4.
Figure 2: Drawing of Tk tree (solid edges) and transactions require-
ments (dashed edges).
7 Simulation Results
In this section we provide simulation results of more complex pay-
ment networks. Real-world transaction networks exhibit scale-free
structure, and behave according to power-laws, e.g., in the distribu-
tion of degrees of vertices, and in transaction rates and amounts [7].
One interesting question is whether in such cases, hubs perform bet-
ter than a 2-approximation to optimal networks.
We compare three network structures in our simulations: the opti-
mal maintenance cost spanning tree (Gomory-Hu tree) derived with
our algorithms, hub topologies (around an optimal node), and a com-
plete graph topology. The latter two lie on two extremes: a central-
ized hub around a major transactor, or a channel between every pair
of agents.
We simulated a network with 100 agents. We created the demand
matrix in a scale-free graph model: generating a random scale-free
graph [20] between the agents (with a certain power-law coefficient),
and setting a non-zero transaction rate for every pair of connected
nodes. The non-zero transaction Poisson rates, were also generated
from a power-law distribution for different power-law exponents.
We checked the ratio of expected blockchain records per second
(RPS) between agents in each of the three scenarios (a complete
graph, a hub, and an optimal spanning tree).
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Figure 3: the ratio between hub and complete graph topologies to
optimal spanning tree RPS v.s power law exponent of requirements
graph degree distribution
As we can see in figure 3, a complete graph topology is becoming
more efficient as the transaction demands’ centrality grows. This is
because with a more centralized transaction demand graph, routing
over a complete graph is closer to hub-routing. Moreover, it seems
that in the majority of cases, a hub network achieves better results
than the tight 8 RPS approximation (2-approximation in the total
maintenance cost). Further simulations show that transaction-rates’
power-law coefficient has no affect over efficiency.
In the full version, we present additional simulation results in the
same scale-free model, including simulations of the greedy game,
and the price of anarchy. We show that power-law coefficients of the
degree and transaction rates have no major affect on the probability
of stability of optimal spanning trees, or on the price of anarchy.
8 Discussion and Future Work
In this paper we defined a model for the maintenance cost of payment
networks, and provided results on liquidity allocation when trans-
action demands are symmetric, and for optimal spanning trees. We
further showed that spanning trees (and in particular hubs) provide
a constant approximation for any optimal graph and routing system.
One of the weaknesses of our model is in the assumption of balanced
channels. Some channels in payment networks might be unbalanced,
and therefore their lifetime may be closer to a linear factor of the liq-
uidity they hold, which will imply blockchain costs will be higher.
Similarly, The question of different routing algorithms for asymmet-
ric demands matrices, remains open and should be the focus of future
work.
Another aspect that is still open, is the theory of online algorithms
for balancing channels. Although some articles presented algorithms
for this problem [29], they have not proposed a closed model for
effectiveness estimation. These balancing algorithms can reduce the
channels lifetime significantly, and the analytical estimation question
still remains open.
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